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ABSTRACT 
A key component of evolutionary models in economics and organizational research, the 
notion of organizational selection is rarely the object of inquiry. It generally suggests instead a 
neutral and unquestioned process, a mechanism explaining organizational success and 
survival. In this chapter, we explore the variation of selection; we problematize the notion of 
selection and do an exercise in conceptual genealogy. We differentiate between three patterns 
of firm selection: Darwinian, strategic and institutional and define the associated “embedded 
rationalities” that buttress those different selection patterns. We illustrate how selection 
differed and evolved through time by exploring two empirical cases – France and the USA. 
Building upon our empirical exploration, we stress some important contributions for three 
theories familiar to strategy scholars – resource-based view, population ecology and 
institutional theory. We also point to some consequences for empirical research and suggest 
new directions for future work on the dynamics of organizational action.  
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The idea of selection – whether explicitly or more implicitly – is essential and influential in 
the economics and organization literature (Nelson and Winter 1982, Aldrich 1999, Baum and 
McKelvey 1999; Hannan, Polos, and Carroll, 2007). Often viewed as a mechanism explaining 
success and survival, selection is in general not treated as an object of study but rather as a 
neutral or unquestioned process. Selection-dependence models have been developed to 
account for empirical phenomena (Barnett 1997, Dobrev et al. 2006, Kuilman and Li 2009) 
but this has rarely come together with a contextualization of organizational, institutional or 
societal characteristics (Zucker 1989; Baum and Powell, 1995). Evolutionary models assume 
that selection is always operative – it never stops measuring “fit” or sifting declining 
maladaptive forms (Nelson and Winter 1982, Nelson 1990, Carroll and Hannan, 2002; 
Hannan et al, 2007). While, in those models, variations are manifestations of the passing time, 
selection as a mechanism seems immutable.  
As Max Weber already alerted us a long time ago, “selection is eternal because no means can 
be devised to fully extirpate it” but the reasons why conditions favour or undermine a social 
form or agent “are so manifold that a unitary expression (for this process) would be 
unsuitable” (Weber 1978: 38; Breiner 2004:291-92). More recently, Isaac and Griffin (1989) 
warned us against the risks of neglecting how much history and theory are intertwined and 
that time is not “ahistorical” per se. Kieser suggested also that “when confronted with long 
term developments”, the assumption that “evolutionary mechanisms do not change over time 
does not hold” (Kieser 1994: 612). Those warnings have started to be heeded. A number of 
notable contributions have attempted to connect more tightly selection-dependent models to 
particular environmental and institutional contexts (Baum and Oliver, 1992; Dobbin and 
Dowd, 1997; Ingram and Simons, 2000). On the whole, though, the contingent nature of 
organizational selection – from both a genealogical and contextual perspective – has remained 
under-theorized.  
The object of this chapter is precisely to problematize the idea of selection and to place it at 
the centre of inquiry. Building on March (1994)’s invitation to question the “evolution of 
evolution”, we consider the variation of selection and even the “selection of selection” over 
time (see Powell et al. this volume for a compatible project on “competitive advantage”). 
Thus, we propose that both the notion of selection and the value attached to it evolve through 
time and space. Going one step further, we suggest that different forms and conceptions of 
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selection reflect different “embedded rationalities”. “Embedded rationalities” are the 
background frames, the contextual lenses through which individual and collective actors 
perceive and read the world (Granovetter 1985, Zukin and DiMaggio 1990, Kristensen and 
Zeitlin 2000). As they become dominant and broadly shared within a particular group, as they 
stabilize in time, those embedded rationalities tend to become transparent and even invisible 
to the actors involved. A contextual and contingent understanding is in the process being 
reinterpreted as reflecting something like “natural law” (Dobbin 1995, Dobbin and Dowd, 
2000, Ferraro, Pfeffer and Sutton 2005).  
In order to illustrate and document both the variety of embedded rationalities when it comes 
to the concept of selection and the process by which one of these rationalities has 
progressively taken over and imposed itself as quasi-natural law in the economics and 
business literature, we do an exercise in conceptual genealogy (Foucault 1994). We compare 
the historical evolution of the concept of selection in France and in the United States. We 
choose those two countries because they constitute distant alternatives, in history, with respect 
to principles of economic action and organization (Dobbin 1994, Djelic 1998, Hall and 
Soskice 2001). From this empirical exploration, we are able to provide evidence for and 
systematically differentiate between three patterns of selection that reflect and suggest 
strikingly different embedded rationalities – Darwinian selection, strategic selection and 
institutional selection. The universalizing use of the concept of selection, dominant in a lot of 
the strategy literature in particular, refers in fact to Darwinian selection – hence to one pattern 
of selection among others.  
As we progress through our empirical exploration, we aim to contribute more particularly on 
three main issues that are also weaknesses, we propose, in contemporary theorizing. The first 
issue is the lack of contextualization of the concept of selection in most of the current 
economics and business literature. In this chapter, we question such a de-contextualized 
understanding of selection. We propose that the emergence of organizational forms and 
speciation might result not only from variations of those forms but also from different 
selection patterns dominant in different contexts. The emergence of organizational forms can 
reflect, in other words, a variation of the notion of selection through time and place. A second 
issue we consider is that of the consequences of selection. Some contributions tend to 
associate selection with isomorphism and convergence (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 
DiMaggio and Powell 1983, Scott 1995). Others argue instead that selection leads to 
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speciation as expressed by different organizational forms and strategies (Amburgey, Dacin 
and Kelly 1994; Rao and Singh 1999). We suggest that these different and sometimes 
contradictory findings question the validity of a universal and de-contextualized 
understanding of selection. A last issue for consideration is the level of analysis. In strategy as 
in biology, there is a debate as to where selection operates and dominant influence really lies 
– genes, individuals or species in biology (Dawkins 1989, Hull 2001), resources, firms or
populations in strategy (Barney 1991, Aldrich 1999, Carroll and Hannan 2002). This raises 
the question of where selection really applies when scholars invoke selection efficiency. We 
suggest that there could be variability in dominant patterns of selection across levels of 
analysis. One could see, for example, a dominant pattern at the national level and pockets at 
the industry or organizational levels (sometimes quite important ones) reflecting and revealing 
other patterns of selection. 
This chapter has three main sections. First, we define our concepts – selection, selection 
patterns and embedded rationalities – and briefly present our methodology. Second, we 
present a conceptual genealogy of the notion of selection in France and in the United States. 
Those two cases are used as illustrations. Third, we suggest a number of theoretical and 
empirical implications. Overall, at the theoretical level, we argue that evolutionary models 
should come to be informed by a contingent understanding of selection patterns. At the 
empirical level, we propose that future studies should include more indicators to control for 
alternative conceptions of selection and avoid sweeping and problematic generalization 
(Denrell 2003, Ferrarro, Pfeffer and Sutton 2005). At a more practical level, we contend that 
any conclusion on the effectiveness of particular managerial practices and strategic decisions 
should be taken with heightened caution and considered in light of contextual “embedded 
rationalities”. 
DEFINITIONS, THEORETICAL EXPLORATIONS, AND METHODS 
Right after World War II, strategy and business studies imported the evolutionary tradition 
from social science and economics (Campbell 1965, 1990; Hogdson 2002; Bowler, 2003). 
Evolutionary models soon became highly influential and were applied, from the mid-1970s 
on, to populations as well as to organizations (Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1984; Aldrich 
1979; McKelvey, 1982). According to these models, inspired by Darwin’s seminal work in 
biology and its further development through population genetics, selection comes after 
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variation – i.e. a significant and heterogeneous alteration of an entity. Selection is the 
operation through which certain variations are retained while others disappear.  
Selection Patterns 
In evolutionary models set within this tradition, selection is somewhat of a black-box, a 
neutral and unquestioned mechanism. For the selection pattern that tends to be dominant in 
these models, we use the label “Darwinian”. However, if we consider the organization and 
business literature that does not inscribe itself in an evolutionary tradition, we are able to 
identify different patterns of selection. We consider, in particular, two alternative patterns of 
selection – that we label respectively “strategic” and “institutional” selection. As it is 
impossible to review all research dealing with organizational selection in strategy, 
organization theory and adjacent fields, the picture we provide of selection patterns’ main 
dimensions is naturally schematic. We differentiate between our three ideal-types along five 
main dimensions (Weber 1978): the driving principle of selection, the dominant selection 
criterion, the outcome of selection, the nature and time dimension of the evolution process as 
a whole, and the role in return of given agents in the process. Table 1 brings together the 
comparison of our three selection patterns. 
Table 1 about here 
Evolutionary models in strategy and business studies are for the most part associated with 
Darwinian selection (Baum and McKelvey 1999). The driving principle of Darwinian 
selection in strategy and business studies is the market mechanism that filters through 
multiple variations at the firm or population level (Baum and Dobbin 2000; Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977, 1984). The dominant selection criterion is market or economic efficiency. 
Selected variations are those that maximize the fit of an entity with its environment and carry 
relative advantages in terms of cost, efficiency, productivity or innovativeness. The relative 
advantage of variations is randomly distributed at the population level and predominantly 
expressed in terms of technological or market advance (Nelson and Winter 1982;). Darwinian 
selection generates technological and economic progress, favouring as an outcome surviving 
(i.e. superior) firms and customers (Nelson 1990). The ensuing process of evolution is gradual 
through time: firms or populations change incrementally rather than through radical jumps 
(Carroll and Hannan, 2002). Finally, in Darwinian selection, the impact of a particular firm on 
the process of selection is hypothesized as insignificant.  
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If we plough through the richness of business studies, we do find evidence that selection can 
be conceived of in other ways. “Strategic selection” is one possible alternative (see also Seidl 
et al. this volume). The driving principle there for selection is power. Some actors have the 
power and capacity to carve, shape and transform the economic landscape and to orient the 
process of selection (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). High-handed fiat of this kind is the 
prerogative of powerful agents, i.e. star CEOs of large firms or key political decision makers 
(Murtha and Lenway 1994; Ingram and Simons, 2000). Selection criteria are then contingent 
and reflect the objectives, values, interests and projects of these key actors (Useem 1982; 
Boddewyn and Brewer 1994; Dobbin and Dowd, 2000). An important outcome of strategic 
selection is exemplarity. The selected form becomes a symbol; the selected firm becomes a 
champion of national ambitions and identity. A number of illustrations come to mind: Nokia 
in Finland, Siemens in Germany, Zara in Spain and so forth. The process of evolution tends to 
be gradual, as a whole, but the possibility exists of radical re-orientation reflecting power 
shifts or major national decisions. We find examples of that in the profound transformation of 
the English national business system in the 1970s and 1980s or in the radical reorientation of 
the Finnish innovation system during the 1990s. Finally, the capacity to influence is not 
evenly distributed – access to key nodes of power (economic or political) being the lever here. 
On the whole, though, and on average, a given firm is not influential (Russo 1992).  
The literature also points to another potent ideal-type – “institutional selection”. The driving 
principle, there, is the network. The structure of the network, position in the network, status 
ordering indicators and fit with social, institutional and cultural norms and values condition a 
firm’s survival and performance (Zukin and DiMaggio 1990; Baum and Oliver, 1992; Uzzi 
1999; Kogut and Walker 2001). Selection criteria are contextual and may change through 
time. They depend upon institutional norms and dominant ideological and cultural paradigms 
(Fligstein 1990; Fiss and Zajac 2004; Rao, Monin and Durand 2003; Zajac and Westphal 
2004; Simmons and Elkins 2004). The key outcome for selected firms is legitimacy. 
Legitimate firms will survive – and they could be at the very same time quite inefficient in 
market or technological terms, i.e. strong survivors but weak competitors (Barnett 1997). The 
process of evolution as a whole is, in this perspective co-evolutionary – shaped by reciprocal 
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interactions and influences between firms and institutions (Lewin and Volberda, 1999).1 The 
role of firms in the selection process is unevenly distributed and could potentially be quite 
strong. The structure and nature of networks and status-ordering indicators depend in part on 
firms themselves, particularly in their interaction with specific agencies (e.g. professional 
associations, accreditation agencies, administrative bodies, lobbyists). Under institutional 
selection, the possibility for given actors or firms to influence the criteria of selection does 
exist through an involvement in the elaboration of rules, norms and standards (Zucker 1988; 
Fligstein, 2001; Garud, Jain, and Kumaraswamy 2002; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003; Djelic 
and Sahlin-Andersson 2006).  
Embedded Rationalities 
The patterning of social life reveals not only the aggregation of individual and organizational 
behaviours but also the presence of structuring institutions. This, essentially, is the idea 
behind the concept of “embeddedness” (Weber 1978; Granovetter 1985; Powell and 
DiMaggio 1991). Building upon the notion of embeddedness, we define “embedded 
rationalities” as the background frames, the localized lenses through which individual and 
collective actors see the world. For readers familiar with Foucault’s work, the idea of 
“embedded rationalities” proposed here is quite close to Foucault’s concept of “episteme” – 
i.e. “the unconscious of knowledge, a level that eludes the consciousness of the scientist” and 
more generally of the actors themselves (Foucault 1994). This idea finds further convincing 
expression in Frank Dobbin’s work (see also Djelic 1998, Kogut and Walker 2001, Hall and 
Soskice 2001, Guillèn 2002). Dobbin (1994) argues that the development of railways in the 
United States, Britain and France during the 19th century was nationally specific and that the 
process reflected in each case a unique political and industrial culture only visible from an 
outsider’s standpoint. Those national political and industrial cultures are, in Dobbin’s account, 
stable and long lasting frames, shaping institutional arrangements and policies in those three 
countries over the long term. The conclusion Dobbin reaches is that there can be several 
efficient ways to organize a given industry, contingent upon the embedding national culture 
1 Kogut, Walker and Anand (2002) propose an interesting illustration. They look at one single strategy (inter-
industry diversification) in five different national contexts. They find that patterns of diversification diverge 
considerably across countries despite strong arguments (theoretically and empirically based on American studies 
and data) claiming the superiority of one type of diversification over others. The explanation is that national 
economic structures provide a context that conditions the emergence of structural opportunities, the coupling of 
agents with resources, and the orientation of acquirers’ behaviour. Technological characteristics matter but do 
not determine diversification patterns as observed in various contexts. Interactions between industrial and 
institutional but also cognitive structures explain more of the observable strategic reorientation. 
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or, as we would call it here, contingent on the “embedded rationality”. In time, when 
embedded rationalities stabilize, they have a tendency to become transparent and invisible to 
the actors involved. The following account of transformations in the American railway 
industry nicely illustrates the idea that contextual frames can become taken for granted and 
harden, as it were, into perceived “natural” or extra-social laws: 
When federal law encouraged price fixing, analysts had dubbed the rail industry 
‘naturally cooperative’. Yet, after federal law outlawed cartels and enforced price 
competition, leading railroads to merge to escape rate wars, analysts dubbed the 
industry ‘naturally monopolistic’. Instead of drawing the lesson that government 
anticartel law made merger a sensible business strategy, analysts drew the lesson that 
economic laws produced antitrust legislation and competitive pricing alike. In short, 
by beginning with the premise that policy choices are driven by extra-social economic 
laws, analysts naturalized policies and hence presumed that they did not need to be 
explained (Dobbin 1995: 278-9). 
While embedded rationalities tend to be quite stable and resilient, they are not, naturally, 
completely impervious to change. Change can be envisioned as radical rupture at breaking 
points or moments of crisis, often in the face of external shocks (Djelic 1998; Hanson 1998; 
Mahoney 2000). More recent contributions, though, tend to suggest that change of embedded 
rationalities can also be of a more gradual but transformative kind, with as it were a partly 
endogenous logic (for a more systematic review see Djelic and Quack 2007).  Certain studies 
suggest the importance of interpretation (Flisgtein 1990; Campbell 2004) or “mindful 
deviation” (Garud and Karnoe 2001) as a mechanism opening up the possibility for change. 
Other contributions point to the importance of the “diffusion” of embedded rationalities and to 
associated processes of translation, adaptation, and hybridization (Jacoby 2000; Campbell and 
Pedersen 2001; Djelic 2006). Others still emphasize the fact that several embedded 
rationalities, including contradictory ones, can coexist in a particular institutional space 
(Crouch and Farrell 2002; Schneiberg 2007). At any point in time, some may be active and 
others dormant, but subtle external or internal pressures may lead to a re-balancing (Morgan 
and Quack 2005). On the whole, we propose that embedded rationalities are more likely to 
change through an historical sequence of multiple junctures that cannot be fully anticipated, 
reflecting a combination of external and internal pressures, rather than through a major, 
externally driven jolt or crisis (Djelic and Quack 2007).  
Organizational selection reflects at a particular point in time and space dominant embedded 
rationalities. For us, selection is a mechanism that legitimizes organizational demise or 
success (Durand, 2006). Hence, to understand the meaning of firm performance and survival 
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in a particular context, we need to make explicit which type of selection pattern is effective 
and which embedded rationality prevails. In a purely theoretical endeavour, we characterize 
here the embedded rationalities that correspond to each of the three selection patterns – 
empirical illustration will follow in the next section. Darwinian selection, we propose, fits 
with a liberal-conservative embedded rationality where selection 1) is thought of as a natural 
principle 2) that promotes economic efficiency and 3) responds to a vision of natural, 
predetermined, and gradual progress. Strategic selection corresponds to an interventionist 
embedded rationality where 1) selection abides by principles enforced by powerful actors 
whose authority and legitimacy are accepted 2) serves particular if not particularistic interests 
and 3) needs to be counterbalanced by more or less potent counter-powers. Institutional 
selection, finally, points to a normative embedded rationality where selection 1) emanates 
from collective frames 2) defends an entrenched sharing of economic surplus reflecting past 
negotiations and power plays and 3) is enacted through powerful and stable institutions that 
embody norms for organizational survival. These different rationalities can co-exist; although, 
depending upon eras and areas, one type of embedded rationality might prevail over others.  
Some Theoretical Explorations 
If we accept the diversity of selection patterns and connect it to a variability of embedded 
rationalities, then this implies that the outcomes of organizational selection are contextual and 
contingent. We explore, theoretically, three different and consequential outcomes in turn – 
firm performance, the nature of entrepreneurship and the nature of competition.  
With respect to firm performance, different selection patterns will have a different effect. In 
Darwinian selection, many entrepreneurial ventures are launched and succumb rapidly to the 
liability of newness. The relative advantage of firms is temporary, individual firms cannot 
influence the selection criteria and abnormal returns will exist but tend to be not sustainable. 
As a consequence, the variance of performance between firms could be quite high but the 
observed mean of performance should be relatively low. In strategic selection, the role of 
powerful agents is critical and it has an impact on industry structure. In general, it will favour 
a situation where, in a given industry, a small number of major players (and at the extreme a 
single national champion) co-exist with a plethora of small and dependent firms. Major 
players act as buffers for smaller companies (often suppliers and co-contractors) with unequal 
performance. Smaller firms survive because a few major companies absorb the cost 
differentials relative to more competitive suppliers. Altogether, because of this socially 
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accepted counterbalancing mechanism of price and profit regulation, the observable mean of 
firm performance should be moderately high and variance should be low. In institutional 
selection, firms may have a significant influence on selection criteria, depending upon their 
structural position and their political and social legitimacy. Oligopolistic situations are likely 
to correspond to this selection pattern, where a few very large firms compete for leadership. 
There is no accepted industry leader and members of the oligopoly vie for the position, 
bringing about instability for their network of suppliers and allies. Under institutional 
selection, firm performance is likely to be higher on average than under other selection 
patterns owing to the oligopolistic form of competition. At the same time, firm performance 
will also reflect the nature – and in particular the stability – of the firm network. Therefore, 
the variance of firm performance is likely to be fairly high. 
Not only do selection patterns affect firm performance; they also impact upon the nature of 
entrepreneurship. A Darwinian selection pattern is conducive to a traditional form of 
entrepreneurship – namely technological or market entrepreneurship (Shane and 
Venkataraman 2001). In this context, those who are the first to recognize and seize 
technological or market opportunities will strongly benefit. A strategic selection pattern calls 
for a different type of entrepreneurial resource to outperform competition. Political 
entrepreneurship is likely there to be more appropriate. Political entrepreneurship seeks to 
influence selection criteria, through cliques and clans and access to political decision makers 
(Mutha and Lenway 1994; Russo 1992). Finally, an institutional selection pattern calls for 
cultural and institutional entrepreneurship. Cultural entrepreneurship suggests the infusion of 
strategies and business propositions with meanings and “stories” that resonate with the 
broader cultural environment (Lounsbury and Glynn 2001). Institutional entrepreneurship 
suggests that companies find ways to intervene in the development of new rules and norms for 
the competitive game (Garud, Jain and Kumaraswamy 2002, Hardy and Maguire 2008).  
Finally, the diversity of selection patterns also reflects upon the nature of competition – and 
more particularly upon the time dimensions associated with competition. Prior research has 
pointed at the critical effect of time in strategy research, through a focus on time scales and 
temporal intervals (Zaheer et al. 1999), on causal sequence and influence (Mitchell and James 
2001) or on statistical validity in longitudinal analyses (Isaac and Griffin, 1989). In particular, 
Isaac and Griffin (1989), Zucker (1989), and Zaheer et al. (1999) remark that time scales 
matter as much as levels of analysis and distinguish micro- and macro- time scales. Reflecting 
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on this matter from our genealogical perspective would seem to bolster this claim. In 
particular, we propose that the pace and time scale stability prevailing among competitors are 
closely dependent upon selection patterns. A gradual but continuous process of change in 
Darwinian selection means that the pace of change in this selection pattern is rapid. But the 
short-lived competitive advantages associated with Darwinian selection induce high 
variability both at micro- and macro time scales – strong in the morning, dead in the evening. 
The situation is different when strategic selection predominates. Changes are more observable 
at the macro level through visible industrial reorganization that sets the rhythm of 
competition. At the microscale level, we find more stability within the circle of smaller 
competitors. Finally, institutional selection means a slower pace of change because of the co-
evolutionary process implied by successive rounds of negotiation and network influences. 
Oligopolistic players defend their position through lobbying activities and social intervention 
and, in the process, protect themselves from failure. Macro-scale time variability is therefore 
limited. At the same time, the increasing density of legitimacy pressure and the multiplication 
of actors there (watchdog associations, NGOs, accreditation bodies, standardizers, rating 
agencies and other third parties) generates intense activity. Micro-scale time variability could 
therefore be quite high. 
Methods for a Conceptual Genealogy 
Our objective in this chapter is to problematize the concept of selection and to address in 
particular the three issues outlined in the introduction – lack of contextualization, expected 
consequences of selection and level of analysis. With this objective in mind, we engage in 
conceptual genealogy, tracing the changing understandings of the word “selection” and their 
embeddedness in different contexts. Conceptual genealogy is a “history of interpretations, the 
history of words, ideals and metaphysical concepts” (Foucault 1984: 91-3). The rationale 
behind such an approach is the conviction that social activity is contextual. A naturalistic and 
a-historical use of concepts places major limits, we suggest, on our understanding of social 
reality, with problems such as theoretical inadequacy, confusion in analysis, and dubious 
validity of the concepts used. A deeper understanding “presupposes knowledge (…) about the 
alternative interpretations of concepts that the historical agents had in their hands” (Palonen 
2002). Conceptual genealogy has been gaining ground in social sciences in general, as a 
counterweight to the dominance of normative and naturalistic approaches and methods 
(Skinner 2002, Koselleck 2002, Palonen 2002).  
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Conceptual genealogy implies the use of historical analysis as a methodological tool. There is 
still today a profound epistemological gap between historians on the one hand and 
organization and strategy scholars on the other (see also Suddaby et al. this volume). 
Historians would reproach strategy and organization scholars for their disregard of 
“differences in culture or time”, for “squeezing phenomena into rigid categories and to top it 
all” for “declar(ing) these activities as scientific” (Kieser 1994: 612). Strategy and 
organization scholars in turn “see historians as myopic fact collectors without a method, the 
vagueness of their data matched only by their incapacity to analyse them” (Kieser 1994: 612). 
Such a gap is detrimental to a more accurate understanding of organizational situations that 
are unique and historically path dependent but still can be framed in theoretical causal chains 
(Schneiberg 2006; Durand and Vaara, 2009). The good news is that such a weakness has been 
well diagnosed and that calls for bridging this gap are becoming louder and clearer (Isaac and 
Griffin, 1989; Kieser 1994; Clark and Rowlinson 2004, Usdiken and Kieser 2004, Booth and 
Rowlinson 2006).  
There are different ways to try and propose a dialogue – i.e. to reconcile an attention to 
historical complexity with the search for theoretical regularities. The one we have chosen here 
is to work through a combination of “ideal types” (the selection patterns and embedded 
rationalities) and case comparison (Weber 1978). We naturally do not pretend to historical 
exhaustiveness but we choose a meaningful and telling comparison (Chandler 1962, Foucault 
1994, Yin 2002, Schneiberg and Clemens 2006). We draw our empirical material from two 
country cases – France and the United States – because they epitomize two strikingly different 
systems of economic action and organization (Whitley 1999, Hall and Soskice 2001) and as 
such make for a good and more powerful comparative set (Skocpol and Sommers 1980: 183). 
We do not fall into historical anecdotes but we are not deductive either. We describe briefly 
the ideological and institutional contexts in both countries and argue that those influenced the 
particular meanings that came to be attached to the concept of selection in each case as well as 
the associated outcomes. 
SELECTION IN FRANCE AND IN THE US: AN HISTORICAL FORAY 
France and the United States are often depicted and represented in the literature as 
constituting distant alternatives with respect to principles of economic action and organization 
(Dobbin 1994, Djelic 1998, Whitley 1999). On a number of dimensions, this can easily be 
documented. At the same time, an historical foray into the “variation” of selection” in both 
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countries points to a more messy picture. In each of the two country cases, we find variability 
and variation, through time, in selection patterns. We also find that projection at the level of 
discourse has sometimes been singularly decoupled from what happened in reality with 
respect to selection patterns. In this section, we explore this complexity.  
France and the Dominance of Strategic Selection 
Colbertism, or high-handed political fiat in economic affairs, can easily be associated with the 
strategic selection pattern as we have defined it earlier in this chapter. Unmistakably, 
Colbertism has profound roots in France. Still, a foray into French economic history shows 
that the dominance of this selection pattern was at times contested. This was true, for 
example, between 1774 and 1776 when Turgot was Minister of Louis XVI and pushed 
forward the ideas of the Physiocrats. This was also true both at the end of the 19th century and 
after World War I, when laissez faire, economic liberalism and Darwinian selection tended to 
dominate. Colbertism again came to be contested in the 1990s and early 2000s when the 
neoliberal wave put its mark on France as on many other countries (Campbell and Pedersen 
2001, Hancké 2002, Djelic and Amdam 2007, Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). The 2008-2009 
crisis clearly dealt a blow to this latest offensive of liberalism and Darwinian selection. In 
short, and over the long period, Colbertism seems to have had the upper hand in France.  
French Physiocrats as local champions of Darwinian selection 
The term “Physiocracy” means “government of nature” and refers to an intellectual school 
that flourished in France during the 18th century. The Physiocrats believed and claimed that 
the only source of wealth for a nation lay in its agricultural production. François Quesnay, the 
main figure of that school of thought, repeatedly argued that agricultural activity was the only 
productive activity. The reasoning was that only the earth could really produce value and 
surplus – in the sense of producing something new where there had been nothing. Coupled 
with this vision of an agricultural powerhouse driving national wealth was a set of conditions 
that would smooth the process and stimulate wealth creation. A starting point was the 
principle that each individual strove to maximize her own satisfaction with a minimal amount 
of trouble and effort. From this understanding of “human nature”, the Physiocrats derived the 
doctrine of Natural Harmony. They claimed that the aggregate maximization of individual 
satisfaction would necessarily and naturally mean a maximization of satisfaction for the 
collective and for society as a whole. And they called for a reduction if not disappearance of 
what they saw as possible impediments to the maximization of individual and hence collective 
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satisfaction. In that context, they argued for laissez faire and free trade, championing the 
removal of barriers to exchange and trade. They extolled competition and denounced 
corporations as well as unjustified situations of monopoly. Unsurprisingly, Adam Smith held 
the Physiocrats in high esteem. There is a fair degree of compatibility between the Doctrine 
de L’Harmonie Universelle and Adam Smith’s reliance on the invisible hand of the market. 
Hence, classical economic ideas coupled with an understanding of organizational selection as 
a natural principle that promotes economic efficiency were available in France from the 18th 
century on (see also Powell et al. this volume). What is more, they were available as home-
grown tradition, not as a mere product of intellectual importation. However, in their 
institutional struggle against mercantilism and over the long period, the Physiocrats and later 
on the liberals and the neoliberals were dwarfed in France. Altogether, they failed to take 
over, secure or create those institutional hubs that could have stabilized, perpetuated and 
diffused their theoretical system. Darwinian selection, and its corresponding liberal-
conservative embedded rationality, were never lastingly installed as a consequence, were 
never lastingly installed.  
A dominant paradigm – Colbertism and high-handed fiat 
Jean-Baptiste Colbert became Finance Minister of Louis XIV in 1661 and in that function he 
set a path that would structure for many years, and even centuries, economic development in 
France. Colbertism was historically the archetype of French mercantilism. Colbert and his 
central administration encouraged the multiplication of manufactures that sold high value-
added goods and thus contributed to the inflow of precious metals. The French administration 
granted a number of privileges such as exclusivity over a market for a given period of time. It 
gave seed capital to initiatives it sought to encourage. The Colbertist administration 
stimulated national industry through control of foreign trade, subsidies to French exporters 
and high tariffs on foreign goods. Colbert also barred foreign trade in French colonies, 
keeping the latter as exclusive purveyors of raw materials for French firms and reserved 
markets for French goods.  
Some of the features of early Colbertism would influence, time and again, French economic 
policy in the following centuries. The Second Empire (1852-70) was another period of high-
handed fiat and strong political monitoring of the economy. France built its railways then, 
launched a large-scale industrialization process and modernized its banking system – all under 
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strong impulse and direct control of the sovereign state. The interdependence between the 
polity and the economy has clearly been a lasting and highly structuring feature of French 
political economy, characteristic of early Colbertism, the Second Empire or even more 
recently of the period of economic development that followed World War II well into the late 
1980s (Djelic 1998).2 Most of the time, this interplay has meant in fact partial subservience of 
the economic sphere to bigger and wider goals – related to state building and national 
development. 
France and the practice of strategic selection 
All in all, principles of economic action have had more to do over the past three centuries in 
France with Colbertism than with physiocratic inspiration. In Colbertism, selection is not a 
natural and gradual process brought about through competition – as is the case with 
Darwinian selection. Nor should it play at the micro-level since particular individuals and 
organizations have only partial and distorted visions and interests. Instead, central power 
emerges as the main driving principle of selection; we can talk of “high-handed fiat”. The 
hand exists and it is the highly visible hand of the polity – even if there can be sometimes 
delegation at the industry or at a local or regional level. This central polity should establish 
and guarantee order, organization and rational discipline within its territory. It should direct 
and supervise the combination of individual efforts so as to ensure a better position on the 
international scale for the collective being as a whole, i.e. the nation. Competition can be 
envisioned but merely as a tool to be used sparingly to stimulate production and efficiency in 
particular situations. This tool should remain under the full control of either an interventionist 
central power or of corporatist and professional bodies. 
From the mid-18th century, French industries have been structured and protected by various 
forms of professional or industrial arrangements. Guilds were key players in the early part of 
the period. They slowly gave way in time and ententes or loose cartels took over, particularly 
after 1870. Cartels were used to stabilize relationships between members of an industry. The 
idea was to prevent destructive struggles and shelter firms from rapid or radical technological 
shifts. Through industry-wide agreements, prices were kept at a level where less efficient 
2 Even contemporary developments in French economic life are clear signs of this political-economic interplay –
see the manner in which in 2002 the CEOs of Vivendi Universal and France Telecom were sacked and replaced 
and how an « economic patriotism » terminology has marked Jacques Chirac’s second presidential term (2002-
2007). An even more recent example is the involvement of the French government, in 2009 and 2010, in 
redesigning French energy champions (Gaz de France and Suez, EDF, or Areva).  
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firms survived and more efficient ones prospered, enjoying higher profits than could have 
been possible in a competitive context. Auguste Detoeuf, a leader of the French business 
community before World War II and Chairman of the large French electrical company, 
Alstom was clear about it: 
Agreements and cartels, because they protect us from the destructive impact of 
financial concentration, allow small and medium-sized firms to survive. Now, it is 
thanks to and through small and medium-sized companies that economic and social 
relations remain reasonable and are prevented from becoming unbearable and inhuman 
(quoted in Dussauze 1938:110). 
In sum, France has long epitomized a notion of selection that fits the “strategic selection” 
ideal-type presented above.  
From Darwinian to Institutional Selection in the United States 
On the other side of the Atlantic, in the dynamic New World of the 19th century, things were 
different. There, the idea of free competition and Darwinian selection were embraced and 
valued as powerful mechanisms of change, social fluidity and progress. The importation of 
economic laissez faire to the United States came together with a fascination for evolutionary 
theories, popularized by Herbert Spencer and Charles Darwin. Soon, however, the American 
society had to deal with the potentially disruptive or even destructive fallouts of Darwinian 
selection. The result, in time, was the construction in the United States of a “workable” 
practice of competition that amounted to what we have defined above as “institutional 
selection” (Sklar 1988). Darwinian selection was still structuring part of the discourse and 
theory but in practice, Darwinian selection had been tamed and largely displaced by 
institutional selection (Djelic 1998). 
Darwinian selection and its unanticipated consequences 
During the second half of the 19th century, Herbert Spencer promoted in Europe and diffused 
in the United States the ideas of both perpetual adaptation and survival of the fittest. Spencer 
defended a view where ongoing differentiation and specialization of an entity coincides with 
the development of the environment that surrounds it. Spencer’s “theory of inevitable 
progress” had quite a significant impact in the United States. According to Spencer, progress 
was the necessary outcome of evolution as long as the natural process of evolution was left 
full and free rein. Spencer identified the struggle for survival as the main mechanism around 
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which this natural process articulated (Haines 1988). And this struggle for survival was often 
associated, combined and conflated in his writings and those of his followers with the 
classical economists’ understanding of competition (Hogdson 1993; Durand, 2006). The 
outcome of this mechanism was that, ultimately, the fittest were being selected while the 
maladaptive were eliminated over time. 
The Spencero-Darwinian arguments resonated with the conditions that characterized the 
United States after the civil war. This was a time of upheaval, turbulence, transformations and 
unpredictable developments where the old rules were inadequate and the new ones still to be 
invented (Josephson 1932; Kolko 1963; Chernow 1990). Spencer’s ideas hence became the 
intellectual foundation for a “social Darwinist” ideology that seduced American “Robber 
Barons”. The “Robber Barons” were that generation of businessmen, who thrived initially on 
the chaotic conditions associated with the American civil war and then established firmly their 
power and legitimacy during the period of corporate reinvention of American capitalism, at 
the end of the 19th century (Sklar 1988; Roy 1997; Djelic 1998; Perrow 2002). The 
evolutionary argument seemed to give legitimacy to violent and rapacious behaviour, as 
necessary stages leading to progress through struggle. The elimination of the “weak” and the 
institutionalization of a hierarchical and unequal division of labour were also justified in this 
way.  
Soon, however, the victims of Robber Barons’ capitalism – smaller business owners, farmers 
in particular and civil society in general – became increasingly vocal. Channelled through the 
Populist movement (Goodwyn 1976), their discontent targeted rapacious and violent practices 
but also the somewhat paradoxical consequences of “free competition” – the rapid emergence 
and constitution of larger and larger aggregates of economic power (see also Powell et al. this 
volume). Indeed, the “elimination of the weak” meant that the strong became stronger. But the 
Robber Barons themselves became dissatisfied in time with systematic chaos and struggle for 
survival in a free-for-all context. The winners of today were likely to be the losers of 
tomorrow – strong in the morning, dead in the evening. The consequence was that they turned 
to cooperation and collusion in an attempt to stabilize their environment. The 1870s and 
1880s were therefore characterized by a proliferation of loose networks and agreements in the 
form of cartels, pools or trusts which peaked by 1890 (McCraw 1984; Chandler 1990; 
Fligstein 1990). On the whole, those cartels proved to be relatively fragile constructions. They 
often failed and failure would generally be followed by another wave of ruinous competition 
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and a new attempt at cartelization. By the late 1880s, this complex and somewhat paradoxical 
situation had turned the issues of competition and cartelization into real political and social 
debates in the United States. 
Regulating competition: The Sherman Act and its unintended consequences 
The enactment of the Sherman Antitrust Act, in 1890, was a direct outcome of this period of 
turmoil and a reaction to the significant concentration of power of cartels and trusts. The 
initial intent of most congressmen, partly under pressure from the strong movement stemming 
from civil society, had been to prohibit all forms of interfirm collaboration so as to re-
establish the conditions for competition and Darwinian selection (Peritz 1996). However, the 
1890 final version of the Sherman Act regarded as unlawful those “contracts or combinations 
in restraint of trade or commerce” (Section 1, outlining what came to be known as “the 
commerce clause”). In a series of cases, the Supreme Court applied the commerce clause 
when violations occurred between states – concentration of power within a given state did not 
fall under its ruling. Hence, as long as cartels, trusts and other loose interfirm networks had an 
impact on interstate commerce, they were outlawed under the Sherman Act (amounting to 
85% of 322 cases during the 1890-1930 period). Somewhat unexpectedly, tight combinations 
and mergers were able to escape regulation under the Sherman Act provided they belonged to 
a given state. American states, starting with New Jersey in 1889, amended their corporate 
charter to allow unrestricted intercorporate stock ownership. New Jersey had become the first 
state to allow a corporation to be created for the sole purpose of owning stock in other 
corporations; other states followed rapidly (Roy 1997). The holding company, as this device 
came to be known, became a powerful legal tool through which industries could organize and 
check competition.  
Between 1895 and 1904, 300 firms per year on average entered mergers and incorporated into 
holding companies – frequently in New Jersey (Parker-Gwin and Roy 1996; Roy 1997). 
Simultaneously, loose interfirm networks were rapidly disappearing from the American 
industrial scene (McCraw 1984; Chandler 1990). In an ironic twist of history, the fight for 
competition in America had led in an indirect and partly unexpected manner to the emergence 
of large, integrated firms. An institutional context relatively unfavourable to cartelization 
turned out to be fertile ground for oligopolies (Thorelli 1954; Bittlingmayer 1985; Fligstein 
1990; Dobbin, 1994; Djelic 1998).  
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In the process, the concepts of competition and selection were reinvented. Neo-classical 
competition and Darwinian selection remained dominant ideological frames of mind in the 
United States, shaping discourse and theory. On the ground, though, and in practice, the 
words “competition” and “selection” came to refer to a very different reality. The “workable” 
concept of competition that emerged in that country around the turn of the 20th century was 
shaped and defined in great part by the antitrust legislation and its particular interpretation and 
implementation. Competition in the United States became associated with oligopolistic 
markets and not with the classical or neoclassical multi-actor markets. A small number of big 
players became the rule in most industries. Each one of those players could be big enough to 
realize economies of scale and scope – which, de facto, stemmed at least in part from control 
over a big market share. The interactions, however, amongst those big players or between 
them and more marginal ones, were strictly and systematically monitored under the American 
antitrust regime – with little if any room left for collusion or other forms of “anticompetitive” 
or predatory practices. The nature of selection, as a consequence, was affected: the Darwinian 
selection pattern was significantly tamed in practice by institutional rules and logics. 
Learning from the Cases and Their Comparison 
From the French case, we learn that Darwinian selection historically had proponents in 
France. It was debated and presented as an alternative to a Colbertist conception of economic 
development. All in all, though, Darwinian selection remained marginal in France and had 
little impact on policy making. Economic affairs were deemed too important to be left to 
market logics, i.e. to the control of uncoordinated individuals. Order and coordination, 
direction and discipline came through powerful actors who defined the criteria and processes 
of selection. Concretely, powerful actors were a mix of guilds, cartels, and associations on the 
one hand, a central polity on the other. From such a perspective, selection emerged as a 
strategic process leading to exemplarity in the form of a “national project”, “national 
champions” or the defense of “national interests” – sometimes perverted into the preservation 
of national elites (Hancké 2001). The French case is on the whole quite representative of the 
“strategic selection” pattern, while not exclusively associated with it. Entrepreneurship, in this 
context, has been at least in part of the political kind. The economic performance of national 
champions tends to be, on average, moderate to high and the variance of intra-industry firm 
performance is limited by the existence of ententes, interlocks and collusion. Over time, and 
with political reorientation, macroscale variability can be quite significant but this is generally 
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associated with microscale stability as the industrial and economic fabric of the nation should 
be protected.  
In the American case, Darwinian selection had a strong impact as an idea from the 19th 
century on. Parts of the business community used the idea that progress should naturally 
emerge from unfettered competition to legitimize actions and decisions that could be harmful 
to others or to the community (Perrow 2002). In time, this led in fact to the creation of strong 
imbalances of power on the market. And, by the late 1880s, federal authorities used the idea 
that unfettered competition meant progress to justify state intervention and regulation with a 
view to re-establishing and preserving the conditions for free competition and Darwinian 
selection. Ironically, the interplay between this latter project and the American institutional 
setting had rather unintended consequences. It stimulated if not triggered the first large-scale 
merger movement, leading in time to the reorganization of most American industries as 
oligopolies (Sklar 1988, Djelic 1998). In the background, the concept of Darwinian selection 
remained dominant in the normative discourse – of economists, regulators and legislators or 
even lay persons. The reality, however, and the practice both with respect to economic action 
and regulation were significantly decoupled from that discourse.  
Oligopolistic markets do not create the conditions for free competition and Darwinian 
selection. Rather, in oligopolistic markets, organizations survive when they create dense ties 
with their institutional environments, adapting to its demands and obtaining social and 
political endorsement. Selection, there, is of the institutional kind. While technological and 
market entrepreneurship was better suited to the first period, institutional selection calls for a 
form of entrepreneurship that is more cultural and institutional. Darwinian selection in the 
period before regulation was associated with low on average and highly variable firm 
performance. Instability, partly as a consequence, became unbearable and meant extremely 
high micro-scale and macro-scale variability. Once regulation and institutional selection set 
in, firm performance stabilized at higher levels. Intra-industry micro-scale variability 
remained significant but there was much greater stability at the macro-scale level.  
CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Drawing on the cases and on what we can learn from each of them as well as from their 
comparison, we now turn to the three issues outlined in the introduction – the lack of 
contextualization of selection, the expected consequences of selection and the level of 
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analysis. We then discuss a number of theoretical implications while pointing also to some 
consequences for empirical research.  
Contributing to Three Issues 
First, putting forward the idea of variable selection patterns and embedded rationalities allows 
us to better integrate the concept of selection into its geographical and historical context. 
Rather than an immutable natural law, selection appears to be a contextual and dynamic 
mechanism. Darwinian selection is one pattern of selection, useful for theoretical reflection 
and empirical simulation but we identify (at least) two other patterns of selection. Different 
patterns of selection correspond to different embedded rationalities that legitimize 
organizational demise and success. An embedded rationality can become transparent and in a 
sense invisible to actors themselves. At the same time, in a given context, actors will not 
necessarily all share the same embedded rationality (Schneiberg 2007; see the interesting 
works on business groups and the different consequences for performance, e.g. Khanna and 
Yafeh, 2007).  
Second, we propose that the two notions of “selection patterns” and “embedded rationalities” 
pave the way for a genealogical perspective on organizational selection and its consequences. 
The literature points to seemingly contradictory and apparently incompatible consequences, 
where selection could lead either to organizational isomorphism or to speciation and variance. 
For instance, the expansion across the world of American-type forms of corporate governance 
creates a powerful isomorphic pressure. A closer look, though, shows that these models tend 
to be adopted and translated in somewhat different ways in different countries (Djelic 1998, 
Kogut, Walker and Anand 2002, Fiss and Zajac 2004, see also Seidl et al. this volume). This 
can certainly be connected and in fact accounted for by the existence and predominance in 
those different countries of various selection patterns.  Depending on which embedded 
rationality prevails in a particular context (liberal conservative, interventionist or normative), 
organizational variation and organizational selection will take different forms. Diffusion of 
practices could be serendipitous, hierarchical, or status-laden. And as we stated earlier, 
performance characteristics, entrepreneurship types, and time efficacy could differ. A 
genealogical and contextual perspective on selection should make it possible to account for 
such diversity of consequences – not by adjusting a one-fits-all notion of selection but by 
tracing the historical and social-cultural contingency of models of organizational survival and 
demise.  
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Thirdly, this chapter makes a contribution to debates on levels of analysis. Developing a 
multi-level perspective on selection requires going beyond traditional conceptions of 
vertically nested levels (resources, firms and populations). To deploy such perspectives, we 
propose, there is a need to integrate a focus on those actors that shape the embedding context 
in which bundles of resources, firms and industries or populations set themselves. 
Legitimating agencies, for example, professions or communities are likely to impact upon the 
evolution of embedded rationalities and, hence, ultimately also on organizational selection. 
Those kinds of actors are clear mechanisms for bridging the various levels across which 
selection plays out. Legitimating agencies – like accreditation agencies or standardization 
bodies for instance – imprint markers and signals unto organizations and impact, as a 
consequence, selection processes and outcomes (Casile and Davis-Blake 2002; Durand and 
McGuire, 2005). Professions as trans-organizational groups (increasingly transnational) 
define logics and representations that contribute to define selection criteria. Very often, 
professions become involved and inscribed within broader normative and regulatory settings 
(Lounsbury 2002, Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Finally, communities bring together 
under various umbrellas individuals, groups, and organizations that share common cognitive 
and normative values and/or common projects (Jones 1995, Djelic and Quack 2010). 
Communities can lead to or generate social movements; they might also imply identity 
clashes, a redefinition of the social compact and induce behavioural but also cognitive and 
even ethical changes (Durand, Rao, Monin, 2007; Guthrie and Durand, 2008; Mirowski and 
Plehwe 2009; Djelic and Quack 2010). Overall, legitimating agencies, professions or 
communities deserve our attention because they play an increasing part in framing the 
rationalities that apply in a given context. These transversal and bridging mechanisms 
complement a more classical approach to nested levels of selection and allow for a better 
understanding of the selection process and its impact on organizational performance.  
Theoretical Implications  
The genealogical and contextual perspective on selection that we propose here questions at 
least three theories familiar to strategy scholars: the resource-based view, population ecology 
and institutional theory. We can neither review in depth each theory and its different variants 
nor study all implications. We limit ourselves to stressing critical implications in each case.  
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Resource-Based View: selection and the situatedness of resources 
An important assumption of the Resource-Based-View (RBV) is that strategic resources, 
through their intrinsic properties, turn into a comparative advantage for the organization that 
owns those resources. Rarity, inimitability and non-transferability are examples of resource 
properties. Rents (abnormal profits) accrue to companies possessing resources endowed with 
these properties. Two questions handicap today the RBV and our genealogical approach to 
selection could help. Debates are ongoing to determine whether competitive advantage is 
logically and ontologically distinct and distinguishable from resources, spreading a suspicion 
of tautology damageable to RBV (Powell, 2001; Durand, 2002; Durand and Vaara, 2009, 
Seidl et al. this volume). Next, by concentrating its efforts on an intra-organizational level of 
analysis, RBV could well downplay the role of structures on strategic advantage and 
performance.  
First, our approach makes it possible to disconnect in part the value of resources from their 
inherent properties and characteristics. In RBV-like competition, what is important is not so 
much resources as their properties (Durand and Vaara, 2009). We contend that the assumption 
relating resource ownership causally to superior performance is flawed. For instance, GE has 
mastery in financing complex multi-billion projects and P&G possesses marketing maestria. 
Another firm with similar resources may not yield abnormal returns because selection patterns 
may not retain the properties that make these resources and capabilities distinctive. Second, 
the value of these properties is not evenly distributed across the world. Political, cultural, 
sociological determinants encode and constrain the experience of competition in different 
markets (see Suddaby et al. this volume). To understand why immense resources (GE’s 
capital resources and P&G’s marketing knowledge) fail in given contexts (for instance, the 
failure of GE’s acquisition of Honeywell in Europe in 2001), one must realize that distinct 
embedded rationalities buttress different selection patterns – hence we suggest a situatedness 
approach to resources. From this perspective, two research paths look promising for RBV. 
First, RBV scholars should think about the operationalization of resource properties (rareness, 
transferability, imitability, and so forth) in connection with selection patterns. Second, we 
need more studies testing how a firm that controls specific resources can resist selection 
pressures in different environments with distinct types of selection patterns (for example 
across national boundaries).  
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Population Ecology in international contexts 
Our approach also has implications for research within the population ecology tradition. A 
strong question around population ecology bears on the use of demographic trends as proxies 
for competition and legitimacy (Zucker, 1989; Isaac and Griffin, 1989; Baum and Powell, 
1995). By contextualizing the selection patterns that prevail in a region or another, population 
ecologists could better describe selection pressures and the influence of legitimacy and 
competition and refine the explanation they provide of firm survival. This is applicable at the 
state level in the USA (Schneiberg 2007) but may be even more relevant for international 
studies. Indeed, in other geographic regions, like Europe, the Middle-East or Asia, the 
assumption of a common selection pattern allowing observers to assume time and space 
commensurability does not hold long (Dobbin, 1994; Baum and Powell, 1995). For instance, 
few studies compare populations internationally and how the development of a population in 
one country affects legitimacy and competition as well as founding and disbanding rates in 
other countries.  
Institutional Theory and hybridized legitimacies 
Finally, institutional theory may find interest in the genealogical approach to selection 
presented here. For a long time, institutionalists have uncovered the mechanisms that 
contribute to organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). More recently, the 
question of institutional change has become predominant and institutional theory has dealt 
with this in part through the concept of “institutional entrepreneurship” (Hardy and Maguire 
2008, Greenwood et al. 2008). Our concept of selection patterns could help refine the notion 
of institutional entrepreneurship. In fact, our approach suggests that the type of 
entrepreneurship most likely to apply is closely connected to selection patterns and embedded 
rationalities. Entrepreneurship may have to be more market and technology-oriented under a 
Darwinian selection pattern. It should probably be more political under a strategic selection 
pattern and more institutional or cultural only in those environments that are characterized by 
an institutional selection pattern.  
Our perspective on selection also points to a promising avenue for theoretical exploration in 
institutional research. An important frontier today for institutional theory is to approach the 
situations of encounter and interface between different institutional logics. This preoccupation 
runs parallel to our questions here on what happens at the points of interface between different 
selection patterns and different embedded rationalities. We need to provide theoretical 
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accounts of those situations of dissonant encounters. Some prior works have begun exploring 
these themes (Ingram and Simons, 2000; Marquis and Lounsbury, 2007). Will one selection 
pattern prevail over the other – and in this case which one and through which process? Will 
there be transformation and hybridization of selection patterns through the process of 
encounter? Those are all questions triggered by the perspective we adopt in this essay. We 
suggest that they are also highly relevant paths to explore today for institutional theory.  
Implications for Empirical Research 
While dominant theorizing on selection bids for universality, bringing in the two notions of 
“selection pattern” and “embedded rationality” makes selection a more contingent object to 
study. From the study presented here, we draw a first implication for empirical research. If we 
want to understand the process of organizational selection, we need to explore the 
environment in which organizations devise strategies and make decisions. Our notion of 
environment encompasses ideological and institutional contexts, cultural backgrounds and 
structural legacies all leading to variations in the meaning of apparently “universal” or well-
shared notions, like money, wealth or performance. As Zelizer (1989) uncovered the 
concealed and plural meanings of money, a generic term so common in economic and 
sociological studies, we strove to uncover the oft-ignored assumptions contained in a term 
common to evolutionary studies: selection. Therefore, when conceiving of organizational 
evolution, we should qualify the embedded rationality (liberal-conservative, interventionist, or 
normative) that each group of agents extols (firms, other collective actors, and institutions). 
Controlling for period and region in models is not enough to really account for the shifting 
nature of the notion of selection or for the uneven influence of actors in their field. A control 
for the type of embedded rationality championed by particular actors should probably be 
introduced in our models. This operationalization requires thorough analysis of texts produced 
by these agents, oral, written, graphical, etc. that express their views in terms of what is 
legitimate to live and what is acceptable to trim.  
Another line of empirical research concerns the explanation of significant changes in 
organizational forms or legal structures (such as the development of holding companies, the 
legal inscription of limited liability, the diffusion of vertical integration or process 
outsourcing, the multiplication of independent regulatory agencies, a spreading wave of 
nationalization or on the contrary privatization, and so forth), the creation or disappearance of 
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professions (e.g. key account managers, strategic planners, knowledge managers, investor 
relations or risk management officers). These major changes often reveal debates, contestation 
and conflicts between different embedded rationalities. The creation or suppression of 
institutions may also follow the swing from a dominant embedded rationality to another. Rao 
et al. (2003) show how 1) the degree of theorization of new logics, 2) the emergence of new 
professional associations, and 3) the modification of social and professional identification 
processes are variables that impacted the embedded rationality of chefs and customers, and 
gave preeminence to Nouvelle cuisine over Old cuisine among French culinary elite. They 
used variables such as the number of published articles in favor of Nouvelle cuisine as well as 
the number and affiliation of chefs participating in the new professional associations as 
proxies for theorizing embedded rationality and the power of activism.  
Finally, much work remains to be done to explain the conditions in which a shift takes place 
from one selection pattern to another. Our U.S. case study provided us with an occasion to 
comment on the shift away from the Darwinian selection pattern, but we need to understand 
the reverse movement – going from strategic or institutional selection patterns to a Darwinian 
pattern as it happens in situations of deregulation, privatization, or reinvention of an 
organizational field. An interesting case to look at, amongst many others, would be the shift 
towards a Darwinian selection pattern in the telecommunication industry after the 
Telecommunication Act (1995).  
CONCLUSION AND A FEW POINTS OF CAUTION 
In sum, this chapter has offered a genealogical and contextual perspective on organizational 
selection patterns and their variation. Selection should not remain a blackbox. Even if 
“selection is eternal”, the ways in which it operates vary through time and space (Weber 
1978: 38). Hence, organizational selection needs to be problematized and contextualized. We 
argue that it is possible to account for the construction of distinct embedded rationalities that 
lead to different notions of organizational selection. As much as scholars must avoid the 
seductive assumption of selection uniformity and universality, practitioners should be aware 
of the embedded rationalities in which they operate, especially when going international. 
Through a genealogical approach of embedded rationalities and selection patterns, as well as 
the proposition of a multilevel perspective bridging and going beyond traditional levels of 
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analysis, this chapter has suggested new directions for future research on the dynamics of 
organizational action at the resource-, ecological, and institutional levels.  
Still, this genealogical approach to organizational selection is not exempt of limitations. We 
mention here only the three most important ones. First, we presented ideal-types of selection 
patterns described along five dimensions. Ideal-types are nice tools to reflect and theorize on 
reality but suffer from definition rigidity. We ask readers to accept the benefits of using ideal-
types as we accept their inherent limitations. As Max Weber already showed when exploring 
authority principles and economic forms of organizations, reality is often more complex and 
hybrid (Weber 1978: 10-20). Ideal-types are conceptual shortcuts to reality; they are not 
always descriptive of that reality.  
Second, we have not looked into the articulation of the different dimensions defining selection 
patterns. Does one dimension prevail over others? Neither have we explored why and how 
one selection pattern fades and another becomes dominant. Is there, historically, a logical path 
and a natural “evolution of selection” – away from a pattern and towards another? We are 
aware of the need for a lot more work in those two directions. Still, we venture a perspective 
on those important questions. We propose that all dimensions are important in structuring and 
defining the selection pattern (rather than one dimension superseding all others). We also 
suggest that all path combinations are possible across the three selection patterns – there is no 
necessary or easy linear path or progression. We can probably identify situations that exhibit a 
move from Darwinian to strategic or institutional selection or in reverse from institutional to 
strategic or to a more Darwinian pattern. 
Third, methodologically speaking, genealogical approaches are probably not as deductive as 
organization or strategy scholars would expect. Genealogical studies strive to uncover the 
origins of some constitutive properties of our societies. Purity, holiness, madness, discipline, 
sexuality, money, the body, childhood and other debated notions in contemporary societies 
have benefited from in-depth genealogical research. In our disciplines however, few studies 
have attempted to explore and question taken-for-granted notions and mechanisms such as 
selection - but also competition, profit, value, authority (see Powell et al. in this volume on 
“competitive advantage”). Hence, one should not take our case analyses for what they are not. 
They are not direct evidence for our theoretical propositions but meaningful archival 
“remains” that help us reflect on the conditions of organizational selection.  
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TABLES 
Table 1. Selection patterns  
Darwinian Selection Strategic Selection Institutional Selection 
Driving Principle of 
firm selection 
Market Power Network
Selection  
Criteria  
Necessary 
 Based on economic 
efficiency 
Contingent 
Defined by powerful 
agents 
Contextual 
Dependent  on 
institutional norms 
Role of firms Evenly distributed 
Insignificant  
Unevenly distributed 
Weak 
Unevenly distributed 
Potentially strong 
Outcome for the firm Progress  Exemplarity Legitimacy  
Process of evolution Gradual Gradual and 
potentially Radical 
Co-evolutionary 
Embedded rationality Liberal-conservative Interventionist Normative 
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